In this paper, I develop an option-pricing model that formally incorporates a disclosure event. Using the model, I …rst theoretically examine how two properties of the disclosure -its overall informativeness and its informativeness given good relative to bad news -in ‡uence the impact that it has on option prices around its release. I then show that, by jointly examining the prices of options with di¤erent strikes, a researcher can measure the properties of a single disclosure event, an impossible task using equity prices alone. Finally, I develop and analyze methods of performing this measurement task.
Introduction
Extensive research studies how corporate disclosures, such as earnings announcements and forecasts, a¤ect …rms' stock prices. A major contribution of this literature has been to develop and implement measures of the underlying features of …rms'disclosures that are derived from the stock-market reactions to these disclosures (e.g., earnings response coe¢ cients and measures of asymmetric timeliness). While these methods are based exclusively upon behavior in the stock market, growing evidence suggests that disclosures also strongly impact option markets. 1 Furthermore, for many stocks, investors trade in several option contracts whose prices each contain information regarding investors'beliefs that is not available from stock prices given options'unique payo¤ structures (Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) ). This raises the question of whether and how researchers might utilize option-market responses to disclosures to better understand and estimate their underlying features.
To address this question, I develop an option-pricing model that formally incorporates a disclosure event. The disclosure can vary along two dimensions that are focal in the accounting literature: the average amount of information it contains (the disclosure's "informativeness"), and the amount of information it contains when it exceeds investors' expectations relative to when it falls short of these expectations (the disclosure's "asymmetry"). The disclosure's informativeness is relevant to studies of disclosure quality and value relevance, while the disclosure's asymmetry is relevant to studies of accounting conservatism, earnings manipulation, and voluntary disclosure, each of which has been linked to information events that vary in their informativeness for good versus bad news. 2 I begin by analyzing how these two properties of the disclosure in ‡uence its e¤ect on option prices. I then demonstrate that a researcher can use option prices prior to a single disclosure event to measure its informativeness and asymmetry, an impossible task using stock prices alone. I conclude 1 See Wolfson (1979, 1981) , Rogers, Skinner, and Van Buskirk (2009), Diavatopoulos et al. (2012) , Atilgan (2014) , and Dubinsky et al. (2018) , amongst others. 2 See, for instance, Basu (1997) for the link between reporting conservatism and asymmetry, Laux and Stocken (2012), Bertomeu, Darrough, and Xue (2015) ) for the link between earnings manipulation and asymmetry, and Verrecchia (1983) for the link between voluntary disclosure and asymmetry.
by developing and analyzing methods of performing this measurement task.
At the model's core is a set of risk-averse investors who face uncertainty regarding a …rm's future value and trade in the …rm's stock and options written on the stock. These investors receive both a gradual ‡ow of information regarding the …rm's value and a sudden shock of information that arrives at a time known in advance, which captures a disclosure event. The disclosure event leads to a jump in the …rm's otherwise continuously evolving price, with a distribution that is determined by the disclosure's informativeness and asymmetry.
I …rst examine how the disclosure's properties in ‡uence expected option returns on the disclosure date. Option returns around disclosure events are highly signi…cant, but their determinants are not well understood. 3 In the model, options earn non-zero returns on the disclosure date if and only if the disclosure contains systematic information; should it contain this information, option returns depend on the disclosure's informativeness and asymmetry.
Speci…cally, a more informative disclosure leads to greater release-date expected returns to call options of all strikes. The reason is that investors place more weight on such a disclosure, causing it to lead to a larger jump in the stock price (in magnitude). This, in turn, exposes options to greater systematic movements in the stock price on the disclosure date.
Interestingly, an increase in the disclosure's asymmetry also leads to greater expected returns to call options. To understand this result, consider an earnings release that may re ‡ect either positive or negative news. Should earnings be more informative for good news than bad news, stock prices will respond more strongly to positive earnings surprises and less strongly to negative earnings surprises. This implies that the distribution of the jump in the stock price upon earnings'release will exhibit more variation on the upside than the downside, corresponding to return skewness. Importantly, the payo¤s to a call option are sensitive to the …rm's price when it moves upwards, but, given the downside protection embedded in a call, are insensitive to the …rm's price when it moves downwards. As a result, the return skewness created by an asymmetric disclosure increases the riskiness of a call option. 4 I next study the e¤ect of the disclosure's informativeness and asymmetry on the prices leading up to the disclosure event of call options whose horizons span the disclosure date.
To reiterate, an increase in the disclosure's informativeness leads to a larger absolute jump in the stock price on the disclosure date. Given that options have convex payout structures, this increases the expected payo¤s to an option that spans the disclosure event. However, as previously discussed, it also causes call options to become riskier around the announcement, increasing their required returns. Nevertheless, netting these forces, an increase in the disclosure's informativeness leads to an increase in the pre-disclosure price of an option of any strike. The size of this increase depends upon the extent to which the information in the disclosure is systematic versus idiosyncratic. Next, note again that asymmetry in the disclosure creates positive return skewness on the disclosure date. I …nd that this skewness increases the pre-disclosure prices of out-of-the-money (henceforth, OTM) call options relative to the prices of in-the-money (henceforth, ITM) call options. The reason is that skewness is associated with the possibility of spikes in the stock price that create large returns to OTM call options.
With these results established, assuming that traders incorporate the properties of a disclosure when pricing options, I move to consider the information that is contained in option prices regarding these properties that is not contained in stock prices. I …nd that stock prices alone are insu¢ cient for a researcher to measure the properties of a single disclosure event. To see why, consider again a …rm announcing its annual earnings. If earnings are above expectations, the magnitude of the resulting stock-price reaction reveals how informative the …rm's earnings are given that the …rm has performed well, since the size of this reaction is proportional to the disclosure's informativeness. However, this price reaction does not reveal the counterfactual of how informative the earnings report would have been if the …rm instead had performed poorly.
Importantly, both of these reactions are necessary to assess earnings'overall informativeness and asymmetry, since these properties depend on both how informative earnings are for good and bad news. Conventional, regression-based stock price measures of disclosure properties, such as earnings-response coe¢ cients, avoid this problem by focusing on the average properties across large samples of stock-price reactions to many disclosure events. These approaches entail substantial information loss, cannot be used to estimate the properties of a single disclosure event, and are subject to econometric challenges (Kothari (2001) , Dietrich, Muller, and Riedl (2007)). Focusing on the case in which the disclosure contains idiosyncratic information, I …nd that option prices in fact enable a researcher to learn the informativeness and asymmetry underlying a single news event. Speci…cally, the model suggests that option prices prior to the disclosure provide the most direct means deriving the disclosure's properties, as it predicts a one-to-one mapping between the disclosure's properties and these prices.
I conclude by demonstrating various approaches to backing out a disclosure's properties from option prices and studying their relative merits using simulations.
My model departs from the approach found in prior work studying option prices around disclosure events (e.g., Wolfson (1979, 1981) , Rogers, Skinner and Van Buskirk (2009), Billings and Jennings (2011) ). This work applies the Black-Scholes-Merton (hereafter, BSM) model to demonstrate that, if a disclosure creates an increase in stock price volatility, it will cause option-implied volatility to climb leading up to its release. However, this approach is fundamentally limited by the assumptions implicit in the BSM framework.
First, the BSM model is a partial-equilibrium model in that it takes the process followed by a …rm's stock price as a given, which implies that incorporating disclosure into the model requires making an unmodeled assumption on how it a¤ects this process. While this approach is suitable when disclosure can be purely captured a shift in volatility, it cannot be applied to consider disclosures that contain systematic risk and/or are asymmetric, since it is not clear how these features a¤ect the stock-return process. This raises a second concern with the BSM model: it requires that stock returns are normally distributed and continuous over time, assumptions that are clearly violated around disclosure events. Markets quickly incorporate the information contained in …rm disclosures, causing stock prices to jump upon their release (Lee and Mykland (2008) , Dubinsky et al. (2018) ). In addition, extensive evidence suggests that stock returns around disclosure events often deviate from normality, precisely because they exhibit asymmetry. 5 Instead, my model …ts into the class of general-equilibrium option pricing models, i.e., those which explicitly model price formation in the stock market. In early work, Naik and Lee (1990) develop a general-equilibrium option pricing model in which investors trade in a stock and options, and update on the stock's value from a stream of dividends that experience non-diversi…able jumps. My paper builds on their analysis by incorporating a potentially asymmetric information release. Other work has studied the e¤ect of investor risk aversion and systematic stock-price jumps on the prices of options (e.g., Pan (2002) ). The disclosureinduced jump in my model occurs on a known date and thus does not entail a conventional jump-risk premium. Nevertheless, this jump increases short-horizon options' expected returns as it creates an additional source of stock-price movement. Additionally, other models consider option prices in the presence of non-normal returns by incorporating features such as stochastic or time-and price-dependent volatility (e.g., Heston (1993) , Dupire (1997) ).
I …nd that asymmetric disclosure events cause option prices to exhibit some of the same patterns identi…ed in this work.
Prior literature also studies the information content of option prices in other contexts, demonstrating that, under certain assumptions, they can be used to (i) invert the risk-neutral density (Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) ), (ii) invert both state prices and investors'belief distribution about future returns (Ross (2015) , Jensen, Lando, and Pedersen (2018)), and (iii) derive the term structure of cost-of-equity capital (Callen and Lyle (2014) ). A large 5 See, for example, Verrecchia (1983) , Dye (1985) , and accompanying empirical evidence in Bertomeu, Ma, and Marinovic (2018) for evidence that voluntary disclosures, which are more informative for good news, lead to complex return distributions. See also Basu (1997) and Givoly and Hayn (2000) , among others, who demonstrate that conservative accounting can lead to varying skewness in returns that creates a deviation from the normal distribution. literature reviewed by Christo¤ersen et al. (2013) explores various statistical techniques to implementing the procedures analyzed in these papers. I contribute to this body of work by demonstrating that because the return distribution around a disclosure is an invertible function of the disclosure's informativeness and asymmetry, one can invert these properties from option prices, and by developing techniques to perform this inversion.
My paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I set up the underlying framework of option prices around a disclosure event.
In Section 3, I analyze stock and option prices and their relationship with the disclosure's properties. In Section 4, I study the information content of traded option prices and discuss methods of implementing these results empirically, and I conclude in Section 5.
2 Option-pricing framework
Assumptions
In this section, I develop the core framework of option prices around a disclosure event that serves as the basis for my analysis. Assume that a representative investor (or, equivalently, a set of homogenous investors) trades continuously over a period [0; T ] in a risk-free bond, a …rm's stock, and European options written on the …rm's stock. While I assume a representative investor in the main text, in the Online Appendix, I demonstrate robustness of the results to the case in which there are many traders with di¤erent prior beliefs. Assume that the representative investor has a generic risk-averse utility function of her wealth at time T , u (W ) with u 0 > 0 and u 00 < 0.
The bond provides the investor with an exogenous risk-free rate of return; for simplicity of exposition, and because the results are not sensitive to the risk-free rate, I set this rate to 1. The options traded by the investor include call and put options of all strikes k > 0 and maturity dates in [0; T ]; their payo¤s are de…ned as usual. The stock pays o¤ a terminal cash ‡ow at time T , which I refer to asx. Assume the …rm's cash ‡ow,x, may be broken down into the sum of two components,õ andd:
The information structure of the model is intended to capture a setting in which the market receives two types of information regarding the …rm's value over time. The …rst type of information, which concerns the componentõ of …rm value, arrives gradually, representing the perpetual ‡ow of information investors receive regarding the stock's value from sources such as the media, data processing, patterns in prices and volume, changes in currency prices and interest rates, etc. In equilibrium, this information will lead to the perpetual movements in the market price of the stock that we observe empirically. To capture this, assume that investors randomly update their posterior beliefs of regardingõ such that these beliefs evolve according to the following stochastic process:
where B t is a Brownian motion. At time 0, the investor has a prior thatõ has a log-normal distribution with arbitrary parameters 0 and T dt = 0, at the …nal date T , investors knowõ, i.e., e T =õ. 6 Note that while I make rather speci…c assumptions 6 Note these beliefs can be formally derived as the result of a standard model of learning over time. Suppose thatõ = log (R T ), where R t follows the stochastic process:
Furthermore, assume that investors observe the stochastic process R t . Then, beliefs follow the process (2). on the stochastic process followed by the investor's beliefs regardingõ, I will later argue that the results are largely robust to various assumptions on this process.
The second type of information arrives suddenly and is digested and incorporated into the …rm's price quickly; this is what I refer to as the disclosureỹ. In equilibrium, this information will lead to a jump in the price of the stock and options that resembles the price jumps observed around corporate information events (Lee and Mykland (2008) 
and + ; 2 1 2 ; 1 . The parameter captures the disclosure's overall, or on-average, informativeness, as a larger value of leads to a disclosure regime that is more likely to accurately re ‡ect the true state of the world. The parameter captures the disclosure's informativeness for good-versus-bad news, which I refer to as its asymmetry. As rises, the investor's outlook regarding the …rm's performance rises more given good news and falls less given bad news, that is,
The disclosure's overall informativeness, as captured by , corresponds to the amount of novel information it provides to investors, and thus applies to empirical studies that examine the amount of valuation-relevant information a …rm provides to investors. The disclosure's asymmetry, as captured by , applies to at least three distinct empirical settings. First, models of voluntary disclosure suggest that when allowed discretion in accounting choices, …rms release more information given good than bad performance, suggesting that discretion corresponds to a larger level of (Verrecchia (1983) , Dye (1985) news; the precise mapping between this concept and conservatism depends upon how one de…nes conservatism. 9 Finally, some models of earnings management predict that disclosures subject to such management are more informative for losses than gains (Laux and Stocken (2012), ). Intuitively, investors can be certain that losses arise from poor economic performance, while gains might arise from either positive performance or successful earnings manipulation.
As part of the analysis, I would like to consider how the disclosure's e¤ect on option prices depends upon the extent to which the information it contains is "systematic," i.e., continue to hold given perturbations to this statistical structure. For example, the market portfolio could be speci…cally modelled as arising from the aggregate payo¤s stemming from multiple …rms with correlated cash ‡ows. However, this would introduce a large amount of notation that is unnecessary to convey the main ideas.
Theoretical analysis
Let P t denote the stock's price at time t and
denote the price at time t of a call (put) option with strike k that expires at time M t. Solving the representative agent's optimization problem and substituting the market-clearing condition yields the following lemma.
Lemma 1
The …rm's date t stock price satis…es:
The …rm's date t call and put option prices satisfy:
The stock and option prices evolve continuously during the non-disclosure windows [0; D ) and ( D ; T ], and jump on the disclosure date D .
The lemma states that the …rm's stock and option prices are valued using a conventional
Euler equation. These prices evolve continuously in the non-disclosure windows as investors continuously receive information about the terminal dividend and jump on the date of the disclosure. Figure 1 plots a numerical example of pre-and post-disclosure stock and option prices under the assumption that = 1 and = 0. Notice that the stock and option prices evolve continuously prior to the date of the disclosure, T = 10, at which point they jump up or down depending upon the news provided in the disclosure. After the disclosure, they again evolve continuously until the dividend is paid at date T = 20.
With the core framework established, I next discuss in detail how the disclosure a¤ects market prices.
Stock prices, stock returns, and the disclosure' s properties
I …rst analyze stock prices and the disclosure's e¤ect on these prices. This analysis is important for understanding option prices as options'payo¤s are de…ned as a function of the stock price on their maturity date. Moreover, the analysis will be useful in Section 4, to 
stock returns on the disclosure date refer to the quantity
Lemma 2 (i) The …rm's stock prices at all dates include risk premia:
(ii) Assuming that the disclosure contains systematic information ( > 0), expected stock prices following the disclosure, as of any date prior to the disclosure, increase in the informativeness of the disclosure:
(iii) Stock prices prior to the disclosure are una¤ected by the disclosure's properties:
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(iv) An increase in the disclosure's informativeness increases the variance of stock returns on the disclosure date and has no e¤ect on return skewness on the disclosure date.
(v) An increase in the disclosure's asymmetry increases the skewness of stock returns on the disclosure date and has an ambiguous e¤ect on return variance on the disclosure date. 10 More formally, these derivatives hold for any possible realization of the investor's information regarding o until time t, i.e., for any sample path of fP g 2[0;t] .
Stock prices exhibit several intuitive features that are important in pricing options. First, they exhibit a risk premium, that is, P t falls short of the market's expectations of terminal value E t [x], implying that the …rm's expected returns exceed the risk-free rate. Second, the size of the post-disclosure risk premium decreases as the …rm releases a more informative disclosure, consistent with the …ndings in Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007) . Intuitively, disclosure reduces uncertainty, which in turn reduces the investor's e¤ective risk aversion. In contrast, the ex-ante (date 0) stock price is una¤ected by the disclosure and its properties, and . This result mirrors the …ndings of Ross (1989) and Christensen et al. (2010) .
Although the disclosure's properties do not a¤ect pre-disclosure stock prices, they do affect the distribution of stock returns on the disclosure date, i.e., the distribution of
Speci…cally, a more informative disclosure increases the variance of returns on the disclosure date. This result follows directly from Bayes'rule, which suggests that a more informative signal increases the variation in posterior beliefs in proportion to prior uncertainty. Furthermore, disclosure that is more asymmetric leads to greater positive skewness in returns.
Asymmetry in the disclosure causes the market to place greater weight on the disclosure when it contains good news and less weight on the disclosure when it contains bad news.
This creates a distribution that exhibits more variation conditional on its value exceeding its mean, which manifests as skewness. Note that these …ndings are consistent with empirical studies that use …rms'return variances around disclosures to measure their informativeness (e.g., Beaver (1968) ) and return skewnesses around disclosures to measure their conservatism (e.g., Givoly and Hayn (2000)).
I next consider the features of option prices surrounding the disclosure event. These prices diverge from the prices of options that would arise in the absence of a disclosure, as the disclosure in ‡uences the distribution of stock returns. Moreover, in analyzing these prices, the investor's risk preferences will play a key role even conditional on the stock price, unlike in models where options can be priced by no arbitrage. The reason is that because the disclosure creates a jump, options cannot be perfectly hedged by trading in the stock (see, e.g., Merton (1976) ).
Option returns and the disclosure' s properties
To begin my analysis of option prices, I consider option returns and risk premia and the e¤ect of disclosure on these quantities. In conventional models where options can be perfectly hedged in the stock, the expected return to an option can be calculated by integrating the product of the option's delta over time and the underlying's expected returns over time.
However, as the disclosure creates a jump and thus precludes hedging, the calculation of option returns around disclosure events requires additional analysis.
as the prices of calls and puts just prior to the disclosure. Then, we have the following remark, which signs risk premia and returns around the disclosure, following straightforwardly from the investor's Euler condition.
Remark 1 Suppose the disclosure contains systematic information, i.e., > 0. Then, (i) Call (put) options at all dates display a positive (negative) risk premium:
(ii) The magnitude of the risk premia embedded in call and put options decrease following the disclosure, that is, call options experience positive expected returns and put options experience negative expected returns on the disclosure date:
Intuitively, as market returns at the end of the model are positively correlated with the …rm's cash ‡ow and call (put) options' payo¤s are positively (negatively) correlated with this cash ‡ow, the price of these options include a positive (negative) risk premium. The disclosure reduces this risk premium as it resolves a source of uncertainty regarding the market's payo¤. It is important to note that part (ii) of this remark relies heavily on the disclosure containing systematic information and does not hold when = 0; moreover, the magnitudes of all return e¤ects studied in the paper increase in .
I next examine how the disclosure's properties, and , a¤ect the magnitude of options' expected returns on the disclosure date. I speci…cally focus on the returns to options that expire just after the disclosure, i.e., E
These returns are most directly a¤ected by the disclosure and its properties, and thus are the most straightforward to study. Note options that expire immediately after the disclosure are not literally traded, but, by continuity, the results extend to options that expire soon after the disclosure. Theoretical results are di¢ cult to produce for longer-dated options as they are subject to returns that follow a mixture distribution and are priced by investors with general preferences, but numerical results suggest that quantitatively similar results hold for options of further maturity dates when investors have power utility. Note further that investor learning regardingõ still a¤ects the value of options whose horizons span only the disclosure, as it represents a source of background risk in the representative investor's consumption.
Within the class of options that expire just after the disclosure, I also constrain attention to options with strikes within the bounds of the …rm's equity price given that it releases good and bad news. Formally, letting P D (ỹ) equal the price after the disclosure conditional on the disclosureỹ, I focus on options with strikes
Options with strikes out of this range are uninteresting to examine: those with strikes above this range always have a value of zero and those with strikes below it are e¤ectively equities (with payo¤s shifted by k), given that they always expire in-the-money.
Proposition 1 (i) An increase in the disclosure's informativeness increases call options' expected returns and decreases put options'expected returns on the disclosure date with strikes
) and maturity date D :
(ii) An increase in the disclosure's asymmetry increases call and put options'expected returns on the disclosure date with strikes k 2 (P D (y L ) ; P D (y H )) and maturity date D :
The …rst part of the proposition states that a more informative disclosure increases the magnitude of option returns. The reason is simple: a more informative disclosure receives more weight by investors, and thus, leads to greater risk on the disclosure date. The second part of the proposition states that a more asymmetric disclosure increases call option returns.
The reason is that it concentrates the payo¤s of these options to the high state, when investors have lower marginal utility. To see this, note these options pay o¤ only whenỹ = y H . As increases, the probability of observingỹ = y H whend = d L declines. An increase in also shifts put options'payo¤s towards the high state, leading to earn expected returns closer to zero.
Note that, in this section, I have only considered the returns to single call and put options. Empirical research has documented patterns in the returns to combinations of option positions on disclosure dates, including straddles and variance swaps (Barth and So Before moving on, I also note that many option-pricing models allow for greater generality in the stochastic process followed by the …rm's stock price than the one that endogenously arises in this section. For instance, several models allow the volatility of price to depend upon time and/or the present stock price or to possess a stochastic component (Hull and White (1987) , Heston (1993) , Dupire (1997) (2008)).
While the introduction of these additional features would change the magnitude of option returns on the disclosure date in the model, they would not change the direction of the impact that disclosure's properties have on these returns. The dynamics of price in non-disclosure periods only impact the options that expire soon after the disclosure by introducing a source of background risk in the representative investor's consumption. Moreover, since the results hold for any risk-averse investor preference function, and since introducing background risk preserves risk aversion (Gollier 2004) , the results are robust to the price dynamics in the non-disclosure windows. I conjecture that this would continue to hold for options with longer maturity dates.
3.3 Pre-disclosure option prices and the disclosure' s properties I next consider how the disclosure a¤ects the prices of options just prior to the disclosure event. I again examine options that expire just after the disclosure. Note that this analysis is distinct from the analysis of option returns, as disclosure's properties in ‡uence both pre-and post-disclosure option prices. Moreover, pre-disclosure option prices have been the focus of prior research on option prices around disclosures, perhaps due to the large, easily identi…ed e¤ect that the disclosure has on these prices Wolfson (1979, 1989 ) and Dubinsky et al. (2018)). I will later show, in fact, that these option prices are the most useful in extracting information about the disclosure's properties.
The next proposition states that all pre-disclosure option prices increase in a disclosure's informativeness, while the e¤ect of disclosure's asymmetry on the pre-disclosure price of an option depends upon whether it is ITM or OTM prior to the disclosure (i.e., whether k is greater or less than the price just before the disclosure, P D ). Again, in the proposition, I
focus on the set of options with strikes
Proposition 2 Consider the pre-disclosure prices of options that expire on the disclosure
(i) An increase in the disclosure's informativeness increases these prices:
(ii) An increase in the disclosure's asymmetry increases the prices of OTM call (ITM put)
options and decreases the pre-disclosure prices of ITM call (OTM put) options:
To understand the proposition, I break down the disclosure's impact on option prices into three distinct e¤ects, which I refer to as the expected-payo¤ e¤ect, the option-risk e¤ect, and the cost-of-capital e¤ect. I provide the intuition underlying these e¤ects for call options. impact of a disclosure on an option's price tapers o¤ as non-disclosure window volatility increases; (2) that the e¤ect of a disclosure on the price of an option is maximized for options with moderate strikes; (3) that the e¤ect of a disclosure on option prices increases in prior disclosure-related uncertainty (d H d L ), and (4) that the e¤ect of a disclosure on an option of moderate strike price declines in investor risk aversion. Figure 3 depicts the impact of the disclosure's asymmetry on pre-disclosure call option prices, comparing the case in which the disclosure is more informative for good than bad news ( = 0:7; = 0:1) to the case in which the disclosure is symmetric ( = 0:7; = 0). The …gure demonstrates that the e¤ect of asymmetry on option prices is highly nonlinear in the underlying parameters of the model. It also suggests that (1) the e¤ect of asymmetry on the price of an option declines in non-disclosure window volatility and (2) the e¤ect of asymmetry on the price of an option is non-monotonic in disclosure-related uncertainty.
Systematic versus idiosyncratic disclosure
Finally, I study how the disclosure's e¤ect on pre-disclosure option prices depends upon the extent to which the information contained in the disclosure is systematic versus idiosyncratic, as captured by . Note that, based upon the discussion above, investor risk-aversion does not change the directional relationships between the informativeness and asymmetry of the disclosure and option prices. Consequently, whether the disclosure is fully systematic or completely idiosyncratic will not a¤ect the directional relationships previously discussed.
However, it can have a material impact on the magnitudes of these relationships by ampli-fying the (price-reducing) option-risk and (price-increasing) cost-of-capital e¤ects. I discuss this in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider the pre-disclosure prices of options that expire on the disclosure date D with strikes k 2 (P D (y L ) ; P D (y H )).
(i) An increase in the extent to which the information in the disclosure is systematic magni…es (attenuates) the e¤ect of the disclosure's informativeness on the pre-disclosure prices of call options with strikes
).
Likewise, an increase in magni…es (attenuates) the e¤ect of the disclosure's informativeness on the pre-disclosure prices of put options with strikes
(ii) An increase in the extent to which the information in the disclosure is systematic causes the disclosure's asymmetry to have a more positive impact on all pre-disclosure call and put option prices.
The …rst part of the corollary states that when a disclosure contains more systematic information, an increase in its informativeness has a more positive impact on the pre-disclosure prices of high-strike call options and a less positive impact on the pre-disclosure prices of low-strike call options. To see why, consider the relative magnitudes of the (price-reducing) option-risk and (price-increasing) cost-of-capital e¤ects created by investor risk aversion.
The (positive) cost-of-capital e¤ect is similar for call options of di¤ering strikes; it simply pushes up the stock price, increasing options'ex-post payo¤s. On the other hand, the (negative) option-risk e¤ect has a greater impact on low-strike than high-strike call options, as an investor holding a low-strike call option has more to lose from a downswing in the stock price.
The second part of the corollary states when a disclosure contains more systematic information, an increase in its asymmetry has a more positive impact on all call option prices.
This might be surprising since, along with the result in Proposition 1, it implies that an increase in ampli…es the positive e¤ect that has on both call options'returns and their ex-ante prices. This result can be reconciled by considering the cost-of-capital e¤ect: recall that an increase in decreases conditional uncertainty given good news, thereby pushing up the equity price given good news and increasing options'expected payo¤s in proportion to
. From an ex-ante perspective, this increase in expected payo¤s more than compensates for the increase in options'risks.
The information content of option prices
I next consider the information that option prices contain regarding the properties of a disclosure. I …rst use the theoretical results in the prior sections to demonstrate that option prices contain more information regarding a disclosure's properties than stock prices. I then formally outline three procedures that may be used to measure disclosure's properties using option prices and assess their merits using simulations.
As a baseline, …rst consider what can be learned regarding a disclosure's informativeness and asymmetry by a researcher who examines the series of stock prices leading up to and following the disclosure event. Lemma 2 o¤ers two key insights into the information contained in these prices. First, it demonstrates that pre-disclosure stock prices are wholly una¤ected by the disclosure. Thus, they o¤er the researcher no information regarding the disclosure's properties. In contrast, the disclosure's properties do a¤ect the distribution of stock returns on the disclosure date: the disclosure's informativeness increases the stock-return variance and the disclosure's asymmetry increases stock-return skewness. Nevertheless, the amount of information a researcher can learn from stock returns on the disclosure date is limited. The reason is that a researcher does not directly observe the entire distribution of stock returns, but instead observes only the stock returns induced by the realized disclosure report,ỹ, which translates into a single observation from this distribution. For example, if the market releases good news, one can use the price response to assess earnings quality given good news, but not given bad news. However, both reactions are essential to learning how informative the disclosure is on average, or how informative it is for good relative to bad news.
The result that stock prices cannot be used to learn the disclosure's properties may be rigorously proved under one of two assumptions: (1) the investor has a CARA utility function with known risk aversion parameter or (2) the investor has a general preference function but the disclosure concerns purely idiosyncratic performance ( ! 0). If the disclosure has a systematic component and the investor has general, wealth-dependent risk preferences, it appears possible to use the path of post-disclosure stock prices to learn the properties of the disclosure. Intuitively, as investors learn new information from sources other than the disclosure, it can change their e¤ective risk aversion with respect to the information contained in the disclosure. This can lead to di¤erential pricing of the disclosure's properties over time, enabling these properties to be inverted. However, performing this inversion problem requires a large amount of knowledge regarding the precise shape of investors'preferences, and thus appears challenging to implement.
Corollary 1 Assume that either (1) the investor has a CARA utility function with known risk aversion parameter or (2) the investor has a general preference function but the disclosure concerns purely idiosyncratic performance ( ! 0). Then, observing the path followed by stock prices around a disclosure event is insu¢ cient to learn either the disclosure's informativeness or its asymmetry.
Note, if we were to generalize the model by relaxing the distributional assumptions on the disclosure's properties, in order to back out these disclosure's properties from equity prices, one would have to observe the stock-price reaction to every possible outcome of the disclosure,ỹ, an impossible task. Similar logic implies that it is also generally not possible to use equity prices around the disclosure even to approximate the disclosure's properties.
Prior empirical literature addresses this issue by estimating the distribution using multiple …rm disclosures and appealing to the law-of-large numbers (Beaver (1968) , Givoly and Hayn (2000) ). That is, this literature either uses regression approaches that incorporate the price responses to many disclosures, or calculates volatility and skewness around many disclosure events. This approach is e¤ective at capturing the average properties of the disclosure events being studied. However, even within a …rm, the multitude of features that determine the properties of their accounting system are constantly changing, such as the incentives of management, the competitive environment, and the regulatory environment. Thus, stockprice based approaches entail substantial information loss. Furthermore, they cannot be used for sporadic disclosures that are dissimilar from other …rm disclosures.
I next show that observing option prices prior to a disclosure event resolves the concern that one only observes a single outcome from the distribution of potential stock-price responses to a disclosure. Intuitively, the return distribution on the disclosure date di¤er-entially a¤ects the prices of options with di¤erent strikes. Thus, by jointly examining these prices, one can get insight into the entire return distribution on the disclosure date. More precisely, the thought experiment underlying the following proposition is as follows: suppose investors price options around the disclosure using the model discussed in Section 2. Can a researcher take the traded prices of options and back out the properties of the disclosure? In the proposition, I focus on the case in which the disclosure contains exclusively idiosyncratic information.
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Proposition 4 Assume that the disclosure concerns purely idiosyncratic performance (i.e., = 0). Observing the pre-disclosure prices of options that expire soon after the disclosure alongside the pre-disclosure equity price reveals the disclosure's informativeness and its asymmetry given knowledge of disclosure-related uncertainty
The proposition states that only the prices of options prior to the disclosure are needed to back out its properties. Intuitively, by observing the prices of options with several strikes prior to the disclosure, one obtains a system of equations in and . This system generally has multiple solutions, which implies that there are multiple ways to back out the theoretical parameters and (i.e., it is overidenti…ed). However, these solutions generally require knowledge of both of the underlying parameters the d H and d L . One of these solutions is particularly intuitive and relies only on the knowledge of the di¤erence d H d L , which intuitively captures disclosure-related uncertainty, as opposed to knowledge of both of the underlying parameters d H and d L . This solution is as follows, for k 2 6 = k 1 :
Stated in words, this solution backs out by taking the price of an ATM call option and normalizing by disclosure-related uncertainty, and backs out by taking the di¤erence between options of two strikes and dividing by the di¤erence in strikes. Note the intuitive reason that this solution requires knowledge of disclosure-related uncertainty d H d L is that an increase in fundamental uncertainty a¤ects option prices prior to the disclosure in the same way as an increase in the disclosure's informativeness, and thus, separating these two quantities is impossible without ex-ante knowledge of one of them. The same conundrum also arises in when examining stock-price reactions: a greater stock-price reaction to a disclosure could either stem from greater uncertainty or more precise information (Nikolaev (2017) ).
While Proposition 4 is derived under a very speci…c assumptions on the distributions of d andỹjd (Bernoulli distributions), the theme of the proposition, that option prices contain information not in equity prices regarding the disclosure's properties, is robust given that one observes multiple option prices that are nonsingular functions of the disclosure's features. Additionally, while under other distributional assumptions, the precise formulas for backing out the properties of a disclosure would di¤er, note that the intuition underlying the calculation of expressions (6) and (7) appears to capture robust, fundamental e¤ects of a disclosure's informativeness and asymmetry. That is, the level of option prices captures the disclosure's on average informativeness, since a symmetrically more informative disclosure creates more volatility throughout the distribution of returns. Moreover, the slope over option prices of di¤erent strikes captures its asymmetry, since a more asymmetric disclosure concentrates the volatility in returns in the upper portion of the return distribution.
In the Internet Appendix, I show that these relationships between option prices and the disclosure's properties generalize to a broad range of de…nitions of disclosure quality and asymmetry found throughout the theoretical literature under the assumption the disclosure contains only idiosyncratic information.
I next discuss the implementation of expressions (6) and (7) and develop alternative methods to measuring the disclosure's properties.
Approaches to measuring the disclosure' s properties 4.1.1 Price-based measures and Black-Scholes measures
The measures in expressions (6) and (7) I refer to the second set of measures as term-structure estimators. These estimators utilize the fact that the di¤erences in option-implied volatility calculated using options with di¤erent maturity dates stem from non-disclosure window volatility. This, in turn, enables a measure of non-disclosure window volatility that can then be used as a correction. More formally, to arrive at these measures, I …rst transform the price-based measures into BlackScholes implied-variance space, and then examine the di¤erences of the resulting impliedvariances over time, across maturity dates, and across strike prices. 12 Formally, consider the following estimators ^ BSM ;^ BSM , given a positive z, a positive integer , and maturity date M D where IV t (P t ; k; ) refers to the Black-Scholes implied volatility of an option with strike k at time t that expires at date when the equity price is P t , and
to the estimator used for disclosure-related uncertainty.
Black-Scholes time-series estimatorŝ
Black-Scholes term-structure estimatorŝ
The timing of the two estimators is depicted in Figure 4 . Note in the calculation of^ BSM , one has ‡exibility in the choice of strikes. However, call options that are substantially ITM or OTM are typically illiquid, and the e¤ect of on options that are too close to being ATM is small and thus may be strongly in ‡uenced by noise, leading to low power tests. Thus, in calculating , the optimal choice appears to be a moderately ITM and a moderately OTM option contract. The estimators also o¤er freedom in the choice of , which refers to the length of time over which one calculates the time-series or term-structure slope of option-implied volatilities. . The outcome of the simulation is depicted in Figures 5 and 6 . Figure 5 suggests that the choice of time period has only a minor impact on the quality of the estimators; periods of 3 days and further appear to perform slightly better than shorter horizons. Figure 6 , which was calculated using a time period of 3 days reveals that the IV slope-based measures greatly outperform their price-based counterparts when the options considered expire 20 days after the disclosure, given large reductions in the extent to which they are driven by outside volatility, 2 0 . 13 For options that expire only 10 days after 13 From a theoretical point of view, given constant the disclosure, the price-based measures of asymmetry appear to outperform those using slopes in implied volatility. Note that the simulations suggest that the asymmetry measure, while mostly driven by the disclosure's true asymmetry, is also somewhat correlated with the disclosure's informativeness, especially when the options considered expire further into the future.
Model-free implied moments
The price-based and Black-Scholes estimators discussed in the previous section are simple to implement, as they use only the prices of three option strikes. However, these estimators ignore option prices of other strikes. Moreover, the price of any given option contract is subject to a variety of demand-related shocks (Garleanu, Pedersen, and Poteshman (2008) Note that model-free implied variances and skewnesses capture the variance and skewness of returns, respectively, under the risk-neutral measure over a speci…ed time period. To understand why there exists a relationship between these moments and the disclosure's properties, …rst note that, under the assumption that investors are risk neutral, the riskneutral return distribution around the disclosure event corresponds to the actual return distribution. Now, when a disclosure contains purely idiosyncratic information, investors are e¤ectively risk neutral around its release, and thus, the model-free variance and skewness will capture the actual variance and skewness around the disclosure event. Finally, since Lemma 2 demonstrates that the disclosure's informativeness and asymmetry manifest in return variance and skewness, model-free implied variance and skewness around a disclosure event should capture the disclosure's informativeness and asymmetry, respectively. 14, 15 Note further that model-free implied moments in fact capture the same intuitive con- Model-free time-series estimatorŝ
Compared with the price-based and Black-Scholes estimators, one has less freedom in calculating these measures; only the time horizon can be chosen by the researcher. and skewness levels in addition to the slope measures. Figure 7 depicts the outcome of the simulations, indicating that the model-free measures generally outperform both the price and implied-volatility based measures discussed in the prior section.
As a …nal point, I note that the measures developed in the paper are founded upon the assumption that investors'prior regarding the …rm's performance is symmetric. To the extent that …rms exhibit di¤erent degrees of fundamental skewness, and this skewness is correlated with the construct of interest, the measures developed here will exhibit a bias. I note regression or matching-based analysis may partially alleviate this concern by controlling for fundamental skewness. Moreover, measures that control for fundamental skewness could be derived by extending the model to allow for such skewness. This approach leads to a system of equations from which one may (implicitly) solve for fundamental skewness and uncertainty, and the disclosure's informativeness and asymmetry. I leave the exploration of such measures, and their robustness to alternative statistical assumptions, to future research.
Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze an option-pricing model that formally incorporates an anticipated disclosure event. I demonstrate how the disclosure's informativeness and asymmetry a¤ect option returns around the disclosure and option prices prior to the disclosure's release. The model suggests that the disclosure's properties are a major determinant of both options' expected payo¤s and their riskiness, and thus should drive the prices and expected returns of options. Moreover, the results suggest that in an e¢ cient market, option prices can serve as a useful measure of investor's beliefs regarding an upcoming disclosure's properties. The measures developed can be calculated on a disclosure-event basis, obviating the need for strong assumptions underlying prior empirical measures.
In part, the paper's contribution is to build a rigorous, yet tractable, framework in which the e¤ect of a disclosure on option prices may be analyzed. While the present paper focuses on only two properties of a disclosure, it may also be interesting to study how other features of a disclosure, such as bias, persistence, smoothness, etc., manifest in option prices. The model also takes the statistical properties of the disclosure as exogenous in order to maintain a focus on how these properties a¤ect option prices. Another extension of the model would endogenize the disclosure to be made by a decision maker, such as a manager, who cares both about stock and option prices, in order to show how features such as proprietary costs or information uncertainty might be backed out from option prices. 
. Then, we have the following lemma, which is well-known; I prove it only to clear any doubts that it may not hold given the deterministically-timed jump.
Lemma 3
The price at time t of an asset that pays o¤ ' (!) in state ! 2 is equal to
, where t (!) denotes the measure with respect to the information available at time t.
Proof. First, note that the absence of arbitrage implies the existence of a state-price de ‡ator, t (!).
Given that the existence of a full set of traded options implies markets are complete, 16 classic results from martingale-pricing theory imply that the representative agent's problem at time 0 assuming they have initial wealth W can be written as (for a proof, see Du¢ e (2010), pages 214-218):
s.t.
This problem has Lagrangian, where is the multiplier:
Di¤erentiating pointwise with respect to c (!) yields:
Utilizing the fact that the risk-free rate is 1, we must have that 16 In fact, markets are complete in the simple setting even without option trade. To see this, note that markets are complete in the windows [0; D ) and ( D ; T ] by conventional martingale-representation arguments. Moreover, at time D , there are only two possible price outcomes, and thus, the market is also complete given trade in a bond and stock. Note further that market completeness is not essential to this result. A utility-gradient approach yields the same result in incomplete markets, under minor technical conditions (Du¢ e (2010), pages 221-223).
. By the market-clearing condition, in equilibrium, we must have c (!) =
. Now, let J t denote the price of the security paying o¤ ' (!).
By the de…nition of the state-price de ‡ator, we have that t = E t [ T ] and t J t is a martingale. Thus,
The expressions for the prices of the stock and options follow directly from Lemma 3. To see that the stock price exhibits a jump with probability 1 on the disclosure date, note that:
This is positive forỹ = y H and negative forỹ = y L . Option prices may likewise be shown to jump.
Proof of Lemma 2. Proof of Part (i) Applying Lemma 1, note that:
Note that
that h is positive and decreasing in z. Moreover, let# t E t õ
and let
. Recall that for t D , P t (y) refers to the stock price given that the realized disclosure is y. Substituting into expression (4) and simplifying, we have that, at times t D , givenỹ, P t (ỹ) =# t + t (ỹ). Using Bayes'rule, this yields:
Thus, for any t 1 and t 2 satisfying the statement of the Corollary, we have:
To complete the proof, I show the …nal term is positive by considering the two cases in which 0 and < 0. First consider the case 0. Then, + 1 implies that 1 . We thus have:
with equality only when = such that:
Proof of Part (iii) Simplifying expression (4), we …nd:
which is not a function of or .
Proof of Part (iv) Since, from Part (iii), P D is una¤ected by , we have:
since it can be checked that Moreover, note that:
which cannot be signed in general.
Proof of Proposition 1. To begin, I prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let h d = h D ;d . Then, 8k 2 (P D (y L ) ; P D (y H )), we have:
Proof. Denote by F B t the …ltration generated by the Brownian motion B t . Then, note that, since F B t is continuous, we have:
Now, conditioning with respect toỹ on the numerator and denominator and substituting the de…nition of h yields:
Now, note that for any k 2 (P D (y L ) ; P D (y H )), we have that P D (ỹ) k if and only ifỹ = y H . Thus,
Substituting for D (y H ) and simplifying yields: 
Proof of Part (ii) By the same argument as in the proof of part (i), we can write:
= E @ @ 1 2 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Proof of Part (i) Di¤erentiating expression (26) with respect to yields: Proof of Part (ii) Di¤erentiating expression (26) with respect to yields:
Setting this expression to zero yields k
Furthermore, note that this expression is increasing in k; this implies it is negative for k < P 
This is negative because d L d " d H with probability 1, d L <d " with probability 1 2 , andd " < d H with probability 1 2 . Now, we can write:
This implies:
which has the sign of
Proof of Part (ii) This follows since:
Proof of Corollary 1. The researcher observes a path of the process fP t g t2[0;T ] . Lemma 2 demonstrates
Therefore, the information in fP t g t2[ D ;T ] is equivalent to
, which again is insu¢ cient to invert either or .
Proof of Proposition 4. Given that the disclosure concerns purely idiosyncratic performance, h (d L ) = h (d H ), and thus:
First, note that, for k 2 6 = k 1 , we have:
Next, note that, given the assumption that P D is observable, we also have that the price of an ATM option,
; D , is observable. Solving for this price, we have:
which implies:
